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The 2016 Devolved Elections in the UK 
Introduction 
The 2016 elections to the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland 
Assembly were the fifth such contests for each institution. It is indicative of how devolution has 
continued to be rolled out that the winning parties in each contest could look forward to presiding 
over significantly more powers than in the 2011-16 period, let alone the 1999-2003 devolved model. 
At first glance, the results in each of the devolved countries in 2016 did not appear radically different 
from the electorate’s verdict five years earlier. Nonetheless beneath the basic headlines there was 
evidence of some shifts in public opinion.  
 
Scotland 
The Scottish Parliament elections were contested with the electorate still suffering a post-
independence referendum hangover. The acute nationalist versus unionist faultline evident in the 55 
per cent to 45 per cent split in favour of continued Union in September 2014 was almost replicated 
eight months later in the Westminster election, this time with half of voters supporting the SNP 
against unionist parties. The SNP had been weaker in UK-wide elections compared to Scottish 
Parliament elections until that point. The 2015 breakthrough yielded 56 of Scotland’s 59 UK 
parliament seats. An SNP triumph appeared assured in 2016; the question begged was its size. Could 
the SNP replicate its remarkable 2011 overall majority? Table 1 shows the results. 
Table 1 Scottish Parliament Election Result 2016 
 Constituency 
seats  
Change 
from 
2011 
Constituency 
vote share % 
Change 
from 
2011 % 
Regional 
vote 
share % 
Change 
from 
2011 % 
Regional 
seats 
Change 
from 
2011 
Total 
seats 
SNP 59 +6 46.5 +1.1 41.7   -2.3   4 -12 63  
(-6) 
CONS  7 +3 22.0 +8.1 22.9 +10.6 24 +12 31 
(+16) 
LABOUR  3 -12 22.6 -9.2 19.1    -7.2 21   -1 24  
(-13) 
LIB 
DEMS 
 4  +2  7.8 -0.1   5.2     0.0   1   -2   5 (no 
change) 
GREENS  0   0   0.6 +0.6   6.6   +2.2   6 +4  6 (+4) 
Turnout: 55.6% (+5.2%) 
The achievement of the SNP in capturing an overall majority at Holyrood in 2011 was truly 
extraordinary under an Additional Member System. Expectations of a repeat were commonplace, 
but the mobilisation evident amid the fervour of the independence referendum and subsequent 
anger at defeat was less apparent. The SNP may also have suffered slightly from some voters using 
their second ballot paper, the regional list vote, to opt for a second choice party. Nonetheless, the 
SNP came very close to achieving a second consecutive overall majority in a system designed to 
prevent majoritarianism, its constituency vote share rose and the Party leader, Nicola Sturgeon, 
enjoyed consistently strong approval ratings. As such, whilst opponents spoke of how the SNP had 
‘peaked’, plateaued may be a wiser term at this stage.  
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The SNP did not promise another referendum, its manifesto insisting that ‘The SNP will always 
support independence but that is not what this election is about’ (Scottish National Party 2016: 10). 
The focus of the SNP campaign was upon the claimed superiority of its other policies and the need 
for more powers. The Smith Commission, hurriedly established by the UK Prime Minister 
immediately after the independence referendum to take forward the emergency devolutionary 
promises of unionist parties, was derided by the SNP as a ‘missed opportunity’ (Scottish National 
Party 2016: 35) which left 70 per cent of tax and 85 per cent of welfare expenditure decision-making 
at Westminster.  
Nonetheless, following the Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016, the 2016-21 Scottish Parliament 
possesses significantly more powers  than the institution created by Labour at the close of the 
twentieth century, with a new Scottish rate of income tax, borrowing powers and control of stamp 
duty, land and air taxes, half of VAT receipts and several welfare benefits. Even the franchise 
differed, with votes for 16 year olds permitted for the first time in a Scottish Parliament election in 
2016, having been allowed in the independence referendum. The UK’s Brexit vote in June 2016 
provided an opportunity to revive the prospect of an independence referendum. Scotland voted to 
remain by 62 per cent to 38 per cent and with consent for Brexit forthcoming from neither people 
nor parliament, a second independence referendum became a distinct possibility.  
Scottish Labour suffered the humiliation of losing second place to the Conservatives, following on 
from the meltdown loss of 40 seats in the 2015 Westminster election. Labour’s vote share has fallen 
in every Scottish Parliament election. Labour still suffers from what former leader Johann Lamont 
described as its London ‘branch office’ status. The Scottish Conservative revival can be attributed to 
three things; clear messages, including unabashed unionism, the promise of strong opposition and 
effective, charismatic leadership from Ruth Davidson. A party changing the leader with the regularity 
of Scottish Labour is also unlikely to thrive: Wendy Alexander, Iain Gray, Johann Lamont, Jim Murphy 
and Kezia Dugdale have all wrestled with Scottish Labour’s problems since the party lost office in 
2007. In a twist on George Robertson’s foolish boast about the future of nationalism, it appears that 
devolution is threatening to kill labourism stone dead.  
 
Wales 
The result in Wales confirmed Labour’s semi-dominant status. It was hardly a resounding Labour 
triumph, the party recording its second-lowest ever vote, but the outcome exceeded performance. 
Labour obtained almost half of the Assembly seats on one-third of the votes. Labour’s constituency 
dominance – the party holds two-thirds of such seats – is such that the party’s thin performance 
beyond its heartlands is not greatly damaging, allowing (minority) government to be resumed. Table 
2 provides the full 2016 result. 
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Table 2 National Assembly for Wales Election Result, 2016 
 Constituency 
seats 
Change 
from 
2011 
Constituency 
vote share % 
Change 
from 
2011 % 
Regional 
vote 
share % 
Change 
from 
2011 % 
Regional 
seats 
Change 
from 
2011 
Total 
Seats 
LABOUR  27 -1 34.7  -7.6 31.5 -5.4 2 0 29 (-1) 
PLAID CYMRU  6 +1 20.5  +1.3 20.8 +3.0 6 0 12 (+1) 
CONSERVATIVES  6 0 21.1  -3.9 18.8 -3.7 5 -3 11 (-3) 
UKIP  0 0 12.5 +12.5 13.0 +8.5 7 +7   7 (+7) 
LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATS 
 1 0 -2.9    6.5 -1.6 0 -4   1 (-4) 
Turnout: 45.3% (+3.1%) 
 
Plaid Cymru restored the ‘natural order’ of second place (2011, when they slipped to third behind 
the Conservatives, might be seen as an aberration). The result confirmed the decline of the Liberal 
Democrats, who had previously enjoyed a consistent seat tally (six in each election, dropping to five 
in 2011) forfeiting deposits in 26 of 40 constituencies and failing to win a single regional seat.  Four 
constituencies provided half of the party’s support, emphasising how the Liberal Democrats barely 
exist as a force in some parts of Wales.  However, the Party’s solitary representative, Kirsty Williams, 
was thrown a lifeline by Labour’s need to shore up its minority rule, being awarded the post of 
Education Secretary. Via an initial tied Assembly vote, the opposition parties had threatened to block 
the re-election of Carwyn Jones as First Minister, before Plaid Cymru agreed a deal with Labour. The 
durability of that deal remains uncertain, given that Plaid’s leader, Leanne Wood, denied her party 
was offering a ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement. Much may depend upon the content of 
Labour’s initial legislative agenda, which includes measures on Public Health, child protection and 
the Welsh language.   
Having made ground at previous Assembly elections, the Conservative Party suffered a disappointing 
result, losing nearly four per cent of their vote, the solidity of Labour’s vote partially responsible, 
along with an uninspiring Conservative campaign and possibly two other minor factors: UKIP and 
anti-devolutionists. UKIP’s rise to obtain seven Assembly seats was a development foretold, 
following the party’s strong performance in Wales in the 2015 Westminster election. The Welsh 
Government and Assembly have consolidated significantly over the previous decade. The 
Government of Wales Act 2006 gave the Assembly primary legislative powers and turned the 
Executive into a distinctive government with a separate character from the Assembly, whilst a 2011 
referendum vote gave the Assembly law-making powers across twenty subject areas. Since then the 
Assembly has also gained powers over some taxes and borrowing 
What factors best explain the result? Party leadership, image and campaign all appear important. 
Plaid Cymru’s Leanne Wood and Labour’s Carwyn Jones were seen as the best two leaders (in that 
order) and polled identically in terms of who would make best First Minister (Scully 2016). The 
images of the parties reflect longstanding perceptions with Labour most likely to seen as 
representing the ordinary person. Crucially Labour was well ahead on the question of who would 
best represent ‘people like you?’ Plaid Cymru were viewed as particularly representative of Welsh 
speakers and the Conservatives were associated with more affluent societal strata (Scully 2016). 
Whilst there was some variation from the 2015 Westminster election, notably Conservative under-
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performance in 2016, the overall message from Wales was as previously: Labour tenaciously 
‘representing class and nation against Plaid Cymru competition’ (Bradbury 2015: 114). 
Labour’s favourable UK-wide image as custodian of the NHS may have valuable in neutering the 
problems associated with health services in Wales, where missed performance targets had been 
highlighted by critics and unfavourable comparisons made with England. Health was listed as the 
biggest single priority by the Welsh electorate, cited by one-third of those polled. Almost two-thirds 
of voters were aware that the Welsh Government was responsible for the NHS, a possible result of 
the attacks on the performance and governance of the NHS in Wales that came from the UK 
government. Jobs were the second most important issue, with immigration’s high ranking at third 
place (almost half of those polled felt that immigration to Wales was too high) contributing to UKIP’s 
arrival in the Assembly (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-35688583, 1 March 2016). 
That immigration was not a devolved issue did not stop it registering as a significant feature of the 
campaign. 
 
Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland, the same top five parties were returned in exactly the same order, with virtually 
the same number of seats as in 2011. On the Unionist side, the DUP and UUP were returned with 
exactly the same totals. A quiet contest did not exactly yield votes of confidence in any of the ‘Big 
Five’, all of whose vote share fell. The results are shown in Table 3. Turnout also fell, as it has at 
every contest since the Assembly was created, albeit only slightly this time. The election saw two 
left-wing candidates from People Before Profit (PBP), one topping the poll in Sinn Fein’s stronghold 
of West Belfast. Following the contest, an official Opposition was formed for the first time.  
 
Table 3 The Northern Ireland Assembly Election Result, 2016 
 SEATS CHANGE FROM 
2011 
 %  VOTE SHARE  % CHANGE FROM 
2011  
DEMOCRATIC 
UNIONIST PARTY 
38  0 29.2 -0.8 
SINN FEIN 28 -1 24.0 -2.9 
ULSTER UNIONIST 
PARTY 
16   0 12.6 -0.6 
SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC 
AND LABOUR 
PARTY 
12 -2 12.0 -2.2 
ALLIANCE PARTY  8   0  7.0 -0.7 
GREEN PARTY  2 +1  2.7 +1.8 
PEOPLE BEFORE 
PROFIT 
 2 +2  2.0 +1.2 
TRADITIONAL 
UNIONIST VOICE 
 1   0  3.4 +1.0 
INDEPENDENT  1   0  N/A N/A 
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Turnout: 54.9% (-0.7%) 
The DUP’s success in getting 86 per cent of its candidates elected was a remarkable achievement. 
The choice of Arlene Foster as leader to replace the retiring Peter Robinson was sensible, boosting 
the Party only five months before the election. Untypical of her party, which is only 27 per cent 
female and 28 per cent Church of Ireland (Tonge et al. 2014)  Foster has appeal to a broad swathe of 
unionists, spanning Church of Ireland moderates and hardline Free Presbyterians; Orange and non-
Orange Protestants; men and women; border and urban unionists.  
The central message from the DUP was that unionists must stop Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness 
becoming First Minister. There is still mileage in sectarian head-counting. Those disdaining that form 
of politics tend not to vote, with non-voting particularly high among the young. The DUP prefers to 
concentrate upon the 55 per cent who do vote. The DUP accompanied the ‘Stop McGuinness’ 
message with a more positive ‘5-Point Plan’ focused upon the economy, jobs, services and 
education. The ‘Plan’ was little more than a utopian wish-list but created a useful aspirational image. 
Having felt obliged to play the ‘Stop Sinn Fein’ card in the early months of her tenure, we will now 
see whether the DUP leader and First Minister ushers in politics owing less to the past.  
Northern Ireland may have had a DUP-Sinn Fein duopoly for almost a decade at Stormont but the 
mutual loathing of their respective support bases remains. Less than one per cent of DUP and UUP 
transfer votes under the PR-STV system went to Sinn Fein. DUP to DUP surpluses ran at over 70 per 
cent with around 20 per cent going to the UUP.  Ethnic bloc voting on traditional lines still prevails. 
As the Westminster election last year showed when the party regained two seats, the UUP, in 
freefall for the previous decade, has stopped the rot but is struggling to articulate a clear alternative 
to the DUP.  
Within Nationalism, there is now a radical challenge from the Left from PBP. The Internationale 
versus A Soldier’s Song represents an interesting contest of ideas and loyalties.  Sinn Fein was 
criticised for complicity in welfare cuts (even though these were ameliorated in the 2015 Fresh Start 
Agreement) and scorned by hardline republicans for managing British rule. This was the first time 
Sinn Fein’s vote share had fallen in an Assembly election, although the Party increased its seat 
majority over its nationalist rival, the SDLP and dominates the nationalist bloc. 
The failure of the UUP and SDLP to close the gap on the DUP and Sinn Fein underpinned 
reconfiguration, as Northern Ireland moved from inclusive grand coalition consociation to a system 
of government and opposition. Provision for an official Opposition came via the Assembly bill of John 
McAllister (ironically to lose his seat in 2016). It allows formal recognition, finance and Assembly 
debating time. Given the presence of the UUP and the SDLP, i.e. unionists and nationalists in 
opposition, opposing the unionist and nationalist parties of the DUP and Sinn Fein respectively, the 
old Unionist versus Nationalist, Protestant versus Catholic, Orange versus Green divisions ought to 
be superseded by new political fractures.  
Nonetheless, a cross-community coalition of unionists and nationalists remains mandatory. It has 
merely been reduced to one party from each side. Moreover, some social issues divide on old 
faultlines. The DUP and the bulk of the UUP oppose same-sex marriage whereas the Nationalist 
parties want legalisation. Although an official opposition has been created of the UUP, SDLP and 
(probably) Alliance, there will also be unofficial oppositions from the left (Greens and PBP) and from 
6 
 
the Right, the solitary Traditional Unionist Voice representative. A period in opposition may sharpen 
the clarity of the messages of the main opposition parties – but what will they find to oppose? 
 
Conclusion 
The 2016 elections re-affirmed the dominant parties in power in the devolved UK polities and 
shaped the nature of politics until the next round of contests in 2021. Party outcomes displayed the 
asymmetry which has characterised the institutional apparatus and powers of governance 
associated with devolution. 2016 saw a continuation of SNP hegemony and the eclipse of Labour in 
Scotland, whereas Wales confirmed its status as a Labour country in which nationalism is weak. 
Northern Ireland maintained a trend evident since the 2003 election; the dominance of the DUP and 
Sinn Fein as the representatives of unionism and nationalism, locked less in a cross-community 
embrace than a mutual acknowledgement of their right to divide the spoils of office. As with all 
previous devolved elections, turnout was below that for Westminster contests, indicating that, 
nearly two decades after their arrival, such battles are still regarded as slightly second order. This 
may be unsurprising given that each devolved election thus far has taken place amid debate over 
what further powers will be conceded from Westminster. Perhaps the 2021 contests will take place 
amid more settled and substantial devolved arrangements in which debate centres more upon the 
use rather than acquisition of powers – but that may be optimistic. 
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